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Abstract
Personal Digital Assitants (PDAs) have become one of the
important tools in our life. Their popularity are due to their
small size and mobility which enable them to be carried
anywhere. Along with their popularity, handheld devices
are starting to become the target for the attackers, who are
mainly interested in gaining the data stored in handheld de-
vices. Therefore, security of handheld devices have attracted
a lot of attention in an effort to protect the sensitive infor-
mation stored in handheld devices. Securing handheld de-
vices is a daunting task. It requires a careful design since the
devices have very limited computational power and battery
life. In this paper, we aim to review the security threats to
handheld computers and propose several possible solutions.
We performed some experiments to test our proposed solu-
tion in an iPaq Pocket PC.
1 Introduction
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) have become one of the
important tools for computing, communications and multi-
media applications. Their popularity are due to their size
and mobility which enable the PDAs to be carried every-
where. To obtain the information available, PDAs can be
connected to the Internet. This situation will make the risk
of having attacks on PDAs higher, especially if we cannot
really know who are the other people that are using the
Internet, and they might be targetting to attack our PDAs
as their resources.
Recently, the PDA itself has evolved with technology and
an explicit example of this technology is a Smart Phone. A
smart phone can perform the task that a PDA can do, but
in addition to that, the phone can be used to communicate.
The other concern appears with this technology since re-
cently some children have a smart phone with them. The
latest psychological threat has shown that children bullying
has caused a big problem [5], in which a child is abused by
being sent several MMS (Multimedia Message Service) or
SMS (Short Message Service) that indicates child bullying.
According to the statistical data, at least sixteen children
commit suicide each year after bullying in the United King-
dom [3], which is of great concern at this moment. In this
paper, we refer a smart phone as a kind of handheld device,
and we use the term handheld device to represent either a
PDA or a smart phone.
Another issue appears from the malicious code which
is related to the ability of a handheld device to be con-
nected to the Internet [9]. The Internet connections will
make the Pocket PC enabled handheld devices vulnerable
to attackers and viruses. Unlike Palm OS, Pocket PCs are
not known yet to become the victim of the virus or Tro-
jan horse. From the experience, we learn that Palm OS
is very vulnerable against these type of attacks [8]. For
example, Palm.Liberty.A is the first Trojan horse program
that attacked was reported to attack Palm OS successfully.
The Liberty Crack Program could delete all of the appli-
cations on a Palm PDA once it is activated [12]. Other
discovered viruses, such as Vapor [12] and Phage [12], also
could make Palm devices infected. Vapor could change file
attributes to hidden, and as a result, you cannot see your
files even they are still in your handheld. Phage works by
overwriting Palm’s executable files. By replicating itself,
this virus keeps spreading to application files until they are
all affected. All these viruses aimed at handheld devices
show that handheld computers are susceptible to malicious
attacks like other computing platforms.
In this paper, we aim to investigate the threats on hand-
held devices and propose a solution to protect against these
threats. In particular, we are interested to protect the infor-
mation that flows in the handheld devices. We aim to ana-
lyze the contents of the information that handheld devices
have and determine whether the contents are appropriate
to be protected by the handheld user. Securing handheld
devices is a daunting task. The security mechanism must be
carefully design so that it is suitable for a handheld device,
since it has a very limited computational power, memory
and battery life.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we briefly review the existing handheld devices. We
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concentrate at the two main operating system available,
namely Palm OS and Windows CE in this section, although
we are aware that there are several other operating systems
that the current handheld devices use such as Linux or Sym-
bian OS. In section 3, we provide the basic overview of a
firewall and illustrate the importance of a personal firewall
to protect such a system. In section 5, we describe the de-
sign and implementation of personal firewall in a Pocket PC
operating system. We note that this design can be easily
adopted to another operating system such as Symbian or
Linux. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Our Contributions
In this paper, firstly we examine the threats to handheld
devices. We also propose two feasible solutions to secure
handheld devices. One solution is to use a desktop com-
puter to act as a bastion host to protect handheld devices.
The second proposed solution is by building a personal fire-
wall for handheld devices. We will highlight the difficulty
of building such a system and proceed with our design and
implementation on a Pocket PC handheld device.
2 Handheld Devices
In this section, we briefly describe two main operating
systems used in handheld devices, namely Windows CE and
PalmOS, which currently dominate the market. A Windows
CE device (which is usually referred to a Pocket PC device)
uses a proprietary operating system from Microsoft which
is known as the Windows CE operating system. The latest
version of Windows CE operating system is Pocket PC 2002
which is designed to run in either a Strong ARM or an Intel
XScale processor. Palm operating system has evolved to its
current version Palm OS 5 which is used by several devices
such as Palm Tungsten or Sony Clie handheld. There are
several other operating systems that are available for hand-
held devices. Psion PDA uses EPOC and MSI’s Eznow
PDA uses Mine OS. Sharp Zaurus uses Embedded Linux
with Linux kernel 2.4.x as its operating system. Newton
OS is used by Apple’s MessagePad and eMate operating
system. The current smart phones, such as Ericsson P800
or Nokia 7650, uses the Symbian operating system.
In the following discussion, we concentrate on Pocket PC
devices. Any handheld devices will have similar features.
A Pocket PC can be connected to the Internet via sev-
eral methods: using a modem connection, using a wired
or wireless LAN connection, using a Bluetooth connection,
an Infrared connection with a cellular phone, or using a
TCP/IP connection with the assistance of a desktop PC.
As we mentioned in section 1, the Internet connections will
make the Pocket PCs vulnerable to attackers and viruses.
It is noted in [16] [15] that firewalls are important to ensure
security in wireless networks.
In the case of a Pocket PC device, a synchronization
software called ActiveSync is used to enable the commu-
nication between a Pocket PC PDA and a desktop com-
puter. This synchronization ensures that both the PDA
and desktop computer have the latest information. The
current version of ActiveSync is 3.7. Pocket PCs can be
connected with desktop PCs by using infrared, Ethernet
networking or modems [13]. ActiveSync offers a convenient
way to Synchronize data between a PDA and a desktop
PC, but it may also potentially deliver viruses between a
PDA and a PC. Viruses may spread via email, software in-
stallation or file transfer from a desktop PC to a PDA and
vice versa. McAfee’s VirusScan for Pocket PC can protect
desktop computers from infection by scanning the files on
handheld devices whenever they are connected to desktop
PCs [20]. PC-cillin for Wireless 2.0 [7] also offers virus pro-
tection to handhelds running Palm, Pocket PC and EPOC.
PC-cillin for Wireless works by scanning data and devices
for viruses during beaming, sychronization, or Internet ac-
cess.
3 Review of Firewalls
A Firewall is a component or set of components that re-
stricts access between a protected network and the Internet,
or between other sets of networks [24]. A typical scenario
of a firewall is illustrated in Figure 1. A bastion host is
a computer system between a protected network and the
Internet. The bastion host is designed to defend against
attacks on the protected network. The perimeter network,
also called De-Militarized Zone, is a network between an
internal network and an external network. The perimeter
network offers additional protection for the internal net-
work.
There has been much work contributed to firewalls and









Figure 1. Firewall Architecture
scribe the types of firewalls.
3.1 Types of Firewalls
According to [24], there are three basic types of firewalls,
known as packet-filtering firewall, circuit-level firewall and
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application-level firewall. The brief description of each fire-
wall type will be described in the following section.
3.1.1 Packet-Filtering Firewall
Packet-filtering firewalls allow or block packets based on
some or all of these four fields: the source IP address, the
destionation IP address, the TCP/UDP source port and the
TCP/UDP destination port[24]. To transfer data across a
network, the data must be divided into small pieces called
packets. A packet, which is the fundamental unit of data
transfer on the Internet, contains only a few hundred bytes
of data. In TCP/IP model, an IP (Internet Protocol) packet
consists of two parts: the IP header and the IP body. Two
important pieces of information, the IP source address and
destination address, are contained in the IP header. At
TCP layer, a TCP packet is contained in the body of an
IP packet. The TCP packet is made up of the TCP header
and the TCP body. The source port and destination port
are stored in the TCP header. The body of an IP packet
might contain a UDP packet. A UDP packet also contains
a UDP header and a UDP body. The UDP source port and
destination port are stored in the UDP header. Packet-
filtering firewall operates at OSI network layer.
Figure 2 shows a sample packet-filtering rule that allows
incoming and outgoing SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Pro-
tocol) connections so that email can be delivered. Rule 1
allows an external host to send a request to port 25 on a
server inside the protected network. Rule 2 would allow
that server on the protected network to reply to the exter-
nal host. Rule 3 and 4 allow the SMTP connection in the
reverse direction, where the SMTP server on the protected
network wants to establish a connection to port 25 on an
SMTP server on the external network. Rule 5 disallows any
other connections.
The advantage of the packet-filtering firewall is that it
is simple and easy to implement as all filtering rules can
be configured in a network router. The disadvantage is
packet filters make decision only based on packet header
information, not on the payload session of the packet. Once
the packet filter fails, the whole protected internal network



















































Figure 2. A Sample Filtering Rule
3.1.2 Circuit-Level Firewall
A circuit-level firewall establishes a circuit between the
client and the server without interpreting the application
protocol [24]. The advantage of a circuit-level firewall is
that it supports a wide range of different protocols using
TCP and protects against packet framentation problem.
The disadvantage of a circuit-level firewall is that it re-
lays TCP connections based on their source and destina-
tion addresses but cannot provide control on whether the
information of these connections is legitimate or not.
The SOCKS package [10] is an example of the circuit-
level firewall. SOCKS is a networking proxy protocol that
can be used to create connections through a firewall. We
refer readers to [10] to get more information about SOCKS.
3.1.3 Application-Level Firewall
An application-level firewall is a proxy server that under-
stands the particular application it is providing proxy ser-
vices for, and it intercepts network traffic for a specific
kind of application [24]. Application-level firewalls are
generally implemented to work at application level. The
main difference between the packet-filtering firewall and
the application-level firewall is that the application-level
firewall must understand the application. Application-level
firewalls are more secure than packet-filtering firewalls as
they can be programmed to allow or deny network traffic
based on information contained in the payload session of the
packet, not just the header information [18]. Moreover, the
application-level firewall does not allow direct connections
between an internal host of the protected network and an
external host on the outside network. All communications
between an internal host and an external host are handled
by the proxy. Thus, the application-level firewall hides the
network information of the internal network and reduces po-
tential threats to the internal network. The disadvantage
of application-level firewalls is each proxy service requires
its own proxy. For example, FTP, HTTP and TELNET re-
quires their own proxies, namely FTP proxy, HTTP proxy
and TELNET proxy. As a result, the application-level fire-
wall must understand each proxy service it provides.
The TIS (Trusted Information Systems) Firewall Toolkit
(FWTK)[6] is an instance of the application-level firewall.
FWTK inludes a number of proxy servers of differnet types
such as FTP, Telnet, Rlogin, HTTP, Gopher, SMTP and
NNTP.
3.2 Personal Firewalls
A personal firewall is a software application used to protect
a single computer. Personal firewalls are essential neces-
sary for those users who have connections such as Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) or cable modem. These always-on
connections normally have static Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dresses that makes the system vulnerable to potential hack-
ers.
There are two basic types of personal firewalls on the
market. The first type is application-level firewall that
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monitors inbound and outbound network traffic and applies
access control on internet traffic. The other type is packet-
filtering firewall that monitors the network traffic based on
their TCP/IP header information [25].
Examples of existing Application-level firewall are
Symantec[21]’s Norton Personal Firewall, McAfee[11]’s
Personal Firewall and Zone Lab[23]’s ZoneAlarm. Prod-
ucts of Packet-filtering firewall are Network Flight
Recorder[17]’s BackOfficer Friendly and NetworkICE[22]’s
BlackICE Defender [25].
We refer the reader to [1] for a complete comparison
between the existing products.
4 Possible Solutions
To resolve problems described in section 1 and 2, there are
some possible solutions that can be deployed in handheld
devices. The first solution is to use a desktop computer to
act as a bastion host to protect the handheld device. In the
second proposed solution, we provide a better protection
mechanism, i.e. by incorporating a personal firewall for
handheld devices.
4.1 Desktop Computers Act as Bastion Hosts
One possible solution is let a desktop computer act as a bas-
tion host. ActiveSync 3.6 provides a feature, called Pass-
Through Connection, to enable a Pocket PC 2002 device ac-
cess the Internet while the device is connected to the desk-
top PC using serial, infrared, or USB connections. When
the Pocket PC is connected to a desktop PC, people can use
Interenet Explorer to browse web sites or check emails. As
a Pocket PC handheld device can connect to the Internet
via a TCP/IP connection with the assistance of a desktop
computer, we can have the desktop PC stand between the
handheld device and the Internet. Thus, the desktop PC
can control the handheld’s inbound and outbound network
traffic based on users’ security rules. The architecture is
shown in Figure 3. However, this scenario is not perfect as
the desktop PC must be trusted. Moreover, due to its mo-
bility feature, the handheld device can be carried anywhere






Figure 3. A Desktop PC Acts as a Bastion Host
4.2 A Better Solution: Personal Firewalls
A better solution is that a personal firewall is built into a
handheld computer. With a personal firewall, the user can
adjust his requirements or policies on handling the cases
that he will encounter. The personal firewall can be tuned
to suit the user’s need. In the next section, we will describe
the design and implementation of a personal firewall in a
Pocket PC handheld device.
5 Design and Implementation of Per-
sonal Firewalls
Before describing our design and implementation of per-
sonal firewalls in handheld devices, we recall the possible
technologies that can be used in Pocket PC 2002 operating
system. Theoretically, this technology can be employed to
perform the packet filtering required in the system. How-
ever, as we will justify in this section, there is no direct
API call that can be used in the implementation provided
by Microsoft and therefore, some other alternatives need to
be investigated.
5.1 Packet Filtering in Pocket PC 2002
Windows 2000 offers an important network Application
Programming Interface (API), known as Packet Filtering
API (PFAPI). PFAPI is defined in fltdefs.h in Microsoft
Platform SDK. PFAPI is quite useful as it enables pro-
grammers to filter out TCP/IP packets by using PFAPI,
programmers can easily control inbound and outbound net-
work traffic. Plooy showed an implementation of a flexi-
ble packet-filtering firewall, called netBlock, with PFAPI in
a couple of hundred lines of C++ [19]. To implement a
packet-filtering firewall, the netBlock only uses five (out of
a total of sixteen) PFAPI functions: PfCreateInterface(),
PfAddFiltersToInterface(), PfBindInterfaceToIPAddress(),
PfUnbindInterface(), and PfDeleteInterface().
Unfortunately, Pocket PC 2002 Software Development
Kit (SDK) does not provide PFAPI, which makes imple-
mentation of packet filtering in Pocket PC 2002 much more
difficult than in Windows 2000. One possible solution to
implement a packet-filtering firewall in Pocket PC 2002 is
to develop an intermediate Network Driver Interface Spec-
ification (NDIS) driver, which will be outlined in the next
section.
5.2 Review of NDIS
NDIS stands for Network Driver Interface Specification.
Microsoft and 3Com jointly developed NDIS, and the cur-
rent version of NDIS is 5.x. Microsoft networking protocols
use the NDIS interface to communicate with network card
drivers. The NDIS implementation on Windows CE is a
subset of the NDIS 4.0 implementation used on Windows
NT[14].
The Windows CE NDIS architecture consists of sev-
eral components: the NDIS wrapper component, Protocol
Drivers, Network Interface Card (NIC) Miniport Drivers,
and Intermediate Miniport Drivers [14]. Figure 4 shows
the network architecture in Windows CE. The NDIS wrap-
per component is contained in NDIS.DLL file and pro-
























Figure 4. Windows CE Network Architecture
Two NDIS protocol drivers, TCP/IP and IrDA, are sup-
ported by Windows CE. Windows CE NDIS protocol driver
are exposed to applications through the Windows Sockets
(Winsock) API. A protocol driver allocates packets, copies
data from sending applications into packets, and sends
these packets to the lower-level driver via the NDIS wrapper
component. The protocol driver also provides a lower level
interface (specified by NDIS) to receive incoming packets
from the Miniport driver. By using the NDIS interface, the
NDIS protocol driver communicates with underlying mini-
port driver and bind to network adapter. A NDIS miniport
driver has two basic functions. One function is to manage
a network interface card, including sending and receiving
data through the NIC. Another function is to provide an
interface to communicate with higher-level drivers, such as
intermediate drivers and transport protocol drivers. NDIS
intermediate drivers include a protocol driver interface at
their lower edge and a miniport driver interface at their
upper edge. An intermediate miniport driver is typically
used to filter packets, translate between different network
media and balance packet transmission across more than
one NIC. Thus, it is a good idea to implement packet fil-
tering at an intermediate miniport driver as it can capture
and filter network packets.
5.3 Design and Implementation of Personal Fire-
wall on Pocket PC
One important role of an intermediate driver is to pass
network packets between a protocol driver and a miniport
driver. So, it is a good place to filter network packets at an
imtermediate driver.
Writing an intermediate driver for Windows CE needs
the Windows CE Driver Development Kit (DDK). Win-
dows CE DDK is included in Windows CE Platform Builder
3.0. In our design, the underlying miniport is the NE2000
driver, and the upper protocol is TCP/IP. After the mini-
port driver loads, the intermediate driver loads and binds
to the network adapter. A protocol driver then sends down
requests to query the capabilities of the adapter. The in-
termediate driver simply passes these requests down to the
adapter, and send the responses back up to the protocol
driver.

















Figure 5. Register an Intermediate Driver
erEntry. DriverEntry is called by the system to load the
driver, and is responsible for initializing the driver. The
DriverEntry builds the relationship between the intermedi-
ate driver and the NDIS library. The intermediate driver
performs two fundamental tasks in its DriverEntry func-
tion. One task is to call function NdisMInitializeWrapper
to tell the NDIS library that the driver is about to regester
itself. Another task is to register the intermediate driver’s
version number, then call function NdisIMRegisterLayered-
Miniport and NdisRegisterProtocol to register entry points
with the NDIS library. Figure 5 shows the procedure for
registering an intermediate driver and initializing the NDIS
library.
5.3.1 Filter Incoming Network Packets
When the network adapter receives an incoming packet, it
calls the intermediate driver to handle this packet. The in-
termediate driver then copies this packet into its own pre-
allocated packet, and send the new packet to a protocol
driver. As each packet contains its source IP address and
destination IP address in the header session, the intermedi-
ate driver can extract these two addresses from each packet
and perform filtering based on source and destination IP
addresses. In other words, the intermediate driver can fil-
ter incoming network packets before passing them up to the
protocol driver (shown in Figure 6). Figure 7 illustrates an

























Figure 6. Filter Incoming and Outgoing Packets
5.3.2 Filter Outgoing Network Packets
When the intermediate driver receives an outgoing packet
from the protocol driver, it copies this packet to its pre-
allocated packet, and send this new copy down to the mini-
port driver. The miniport driver then send this packet out.
As mentioned in 5.3.1, each network packet includes its
5
Figure 7. Filtering Incoming and Outgoing Net-
work Traffic
source and destination IP addresses in its header session,
the intermediate driver can extract these two IP addresses
from the packet header and perform the filtering based on
source and destination IP addresses. Thus, the interme-
diate driver can filter the outgoing network packets before
passing them down to the adapter (shown in Figure 6). Fig-
ure 7 illustrates an example of filtering outgoing network
traffic.
6 Conclusion
Handheld computers are important computing tools due
to their size and light weight. However, handheld devices
also become attackers’ targets as they become more popu-
lar. We reviewed some security threats to handheld com-
puters and proposed several possible solutions. The first
solution is to use a desktop computer as a bastion host.
The second one is to build a personal firewall in a hand-
held computer. We highlighted the difficulty of building a
personal firewall in a Pocket PC operating system. We de-
scribed an implementation in an iPAQ Pocket PC which is
equipped with a Strong ARM processor with 206 MHz.
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